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STATE NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE STATUTES:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
I. Introduction
In 1972 the United States Supreme Court resolved a long-standing con-
stitutional question: Are reporters and other journalists protected by the first
amendment to such an extent that they may refuse to testify before an official
proceeding without being judged in contempt? Much to the dismay of newsmen
and civil libertarians, the Court, by a five-to-four margin, denied that such a con-
stitutionally based privilege exists. The decision, Branzburg V. Hayes,' made it
clear that the full disclosure of the truth and the interests of justice dependent
thereon outweigh any reasons for granting journalists an evidentiary privilege on
first amendment grounds. Accordingly, those advocating the privilege can find
little solace in Branzburg if they choose to argue from a purely constitutional
standpoint. However, a short passage in Mr. Justice White's plurality opinion
leaves open the possibility that journalists may obtain their privilege through
legislative means, either on the federal or the state level or both:
At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a
statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion
standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to address the
evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience
from time to time may dictate. There is also merit in leaving state legis-
latures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards
in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the relations between
law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without
saying, of course, that we are powerless to erect any bar to state courts
responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as
to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.
2
Currently, congressional proposals for a federal newman's privilege statute
flounder in committee. However, seventeen states already have various forms of
newsman's privilege statutes in effect, all having adopted them prior to Branz-
burg. Absent federal legislation and a common law privilege (which no Amer-
ican court has ever granted), the post-Branzburg period leaves the reporters
with only the so-called state "shield" laws as a source of protection. The purpose
of this study is to analyze critically these statutes, pointing out their weak and
strong features, noting comparisons and contrasts, and suggesting possible amend-
ments and alternative courses of action.
II. The Rationale Behind the Shield Statutes
The decision whether any shield statute is desirable must be a function of
two competing values: availability of information to the public versus efficiency
1 403 U.S. 665 (1972).
2 Id. at 706.
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in the search for truth in the courts.' While each state adopted its shield law in
reaction to different specific stimuli, a general rationale can be suggested which
includes most legislative intentions in this field. The essential premise for af-
fording such protection consists of a simple logical relationship: First, the public
is served by the press, whose primary function is to keep the people well informed.
Second, the press cannot perform that function unless journalists can protect
their sources of information. A number of extensive empirical studies have been
made which show how heavily newsmen rely upon confidential informants and
how such sources would "dry up" should the reporter be required to testify and
reveal his sources before grand juries, legislative hearings, etc.4 Legislatures in
states with shield statutes appear generally to have accepted this rationale, con-
cluding that the confidential relationship between the newsman and his source is
another of those relationships such as attorney-client, husband-wife, and priest-
penitent, which deserve to be fostered and held inviolate for public policy reasons.
Seventeen states, in seventeen different ways, have given the newsman a privi-
leged status unrecognized outside statutory law. If one accepts the above ration-
ale, the importance of these statutes cannot be overemphasized, for they are the
only explicit protection the newsman has at present.
III. Which Media Are Protected?
With few exceptions, the shield statutes cover both broadcast and print
media, the latter having been protected from the initial enactment of these
statutes and the former gaining protection by amendment only in the late 1940's
and 1950's. For example, Maryland was the first state to offer the press a
testimonial privilege, having done so in 1896;' however, the broadcast media
did not gain coverage until 1951. New Jersey remains the only shield state
which protects only newspapers,6 an apparent anomaly in an era when the public
relies upon the broadcast media for the majority of its information.
A problem arises under those statutes which do not provide comprehensive
definitions of "newspapers" and similar terms. For example, the California
statute covers those connected with newspapers, press associations, wire services,
and radio and television stations.7 A 1964 case interpreted the statute so as not
to include magazines within the ambit of protection, stating that "newspaper"
means "newspaper" and nothing else. Such a narrow statutory construction is
common in this area of the law since it is a generally followed rule that statutes in
derogation of the common law are subject to very strict interpretation.' Facing
such a consequence, carelessly drawn statutes may severely restrict protection
3 Note, Privileged Communications-News Media-A "Shield Statute" for Oregon? 46
ORE. L. Rxv. 99, 102 (1966).
4 V. BLASr, PRESS SUBPOENAS: AN EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1971); GUEST AND
STANZLER, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.
L. REV. 18 (1969).
5 MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1971).
6 N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, ch. 84A, § 21 (Supp. 1972).
7 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966).
8 Cepeda v. Cohane, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
9 Yount v. National Bank of Jackson, 327 Mich. 342, 42 N.W.2d 110 (1950); State v.
Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, 1 N.J. 14, 61 A.2d 503 (1948).
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apparently intended to be much broader. The California statute is a good ex-
ample of this. There the statute was adopted with the announced policy of en-
couraging confidences between journalists and informants and preserving them
inviolate, with no evident legislative reason existing for excepting magazine
writers."0 Needless to say, careful draftsmanship is an absolute necessity in this
area of legislation.
Indiana went to great lengths in its shield statute to define exactly what a
"newspaper" is. To be protected, print newsmen in Indiana must work for a
newspaper which has been published for at least five consecutive years in the
same town or city and has a paid circulation of at least two per cent of the county
in which it is published.1 Technically, a four-year-old newspaper with a large
circulation, as well as a failing century-old newspaper with a very small circula-
tion, is not included in Indiana. Such overspecificity and restrictive require-
ments both run counter to the stated public policy objective and invite a con-
stitutional challenge based upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Some states have, however, reached a comfortable compromise in the
specificity battle. The recently adopted (1970) New York statute defines
newspaper as:
a paper that is printed and distributed ordinarily not less frequently
than once a week, and has done so for at least one year, and that contains
news, articles of opinion (as editorials), features, advertising, or other mat-
ter regarded as of current interest, has a paid circulation and has been
entered at the United States post-office as second-class matter.1 2
Admittedly, one can never avoid all definitional problems, but carefully drawn
statutes like New York's can reduce the semantic disputes to a minimum and
insure that only those people determined legitimately to be in need of protection
are so included.
Overly broad provisions in proposed shield laws have sometimes con-
tributed to their legislative downfall. In the 1960's an Oregon law revision com-
mission recommended a statute which would protect "... . those engaged in the
work of gathering or disseminating news."'" Taken literally, such a law would
protect even backyard gossipers, as well as bona fide newsmen. This, and other
similarly broad clauses, no doubt was one of the causes for the proposal's re-
jection by the Oregon Legislature.
IV. Which Individuals Are Protected?
A corollary problem involves the scope of employment of the individual to
be protected. On the whole, states have done a good job in clearly delimiting
this area of coverage. Most of them follow a formula similar to Alabama's:
10 Note, Newsman's Immunity Needs a Shot in the Arm, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 56
(1970).
11 IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1 (1973).
12 N.Y. Civ. RioiTs LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1972).
13 Note, supra note 3, at 104.
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No person engaged in, connected with, or employed on any newspaper (or
radio broadcasting station or television station) while engaged in a news-
gathering capacity shall be compelled to .... :4
The term "newsgathering capacity," a common one among shield statutes,
presents interpretive problems in light of the nature of the journalistic profession.
Reporters are prone to say that they are always on the job, so the contention
naturally follows that they are always shielded, assuming other qualifications are
met. Gases are lacking which interpret "newsgathering capacity" but, given the
tendency of courts to construe shield statutes very narrowly, chances are that only
bona fide reportorial endeavors can gain coverage.
Michigan15 provides no scope of employment requirement, and previous
to 1968 neither did Pennsylvania."8 The omission of such a requirement provides
an obvious opportunity for abuse which is the product of careless drafting. Cali-
fornia's statute protects a "... . publisher, editor, reporter, or other person con-
nected with or employed upon a newspaper. ..."1 Since the "newsgathering
capacity" requirement is lacking, this could ostensibly include a printer or even a
delivery boy.
For most of the statutes, current employment by the medium is a prerequisite
for protection. 8 Difficulty arises when a former employee of a newspaper or
broadcasting station is subpoenaed regarding information obtained during the
period of his previous employment. Broad construction might include such an
individual but, practically speaking, statutory provisions are necessary to guar-
antee the protection. This has been done in the Louisiana shield statute, which
includes ".... all persons who were previously connected with any news media...
as to the information obtained while so connected."' 9 California also adopted
such an approach in its 1971 amended version.2" This extension of coverage
seems only logical if the policy of the newsman's shield law is to encourage and
preserve journalistic confidences for the public welfare. The mere passage of time
and the severance of employment should not destroy a previously valid con-
fidential relationship.
It is recognized throughout the shield jurisdictions that the statute, while it
may by avowed intention protect the confidential relationship, is available only
to the newsman and not to the source or informant.21 The privilege statutes
create a right personal to the reporter, one which only he can invoke. It cannot
be invoked by the person who communicated to the newsman in order to prevent
the latter from testifying. A contrast with other evidentiary privileges is evident.
In the traditional confidential relationships (doctor-patient, priest-penitent, etc.),
neither party can testify at all without the other's consent, so a great deal more
14 AXA. CoDE tit. 7, § 370 (1960).
15 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1972). The Mchigan statute is further uniquely lim-
ited in that it alone among the shield jurisdictions applies only to criminal proceedings. -
16 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Gum. Supp. 1972).
17 CAL. Evm. Cons § 2 (West 1971).
18 E.g., ARE:. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); Ky. R v. STAT. § 421.100 (1969); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 35, § 2 (1971).
19 LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 45:1451 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
20 CAL. EvIn. CODE § 1070 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
21 Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing and Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416(1964); Hestand v. State, 273 N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1971).
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than mere protection from contempt is concerned. The confidential communica-
tion itself is privileged, not just the recipient of it. Under newsman's privilege
statutes, the newsman is the principal object of protection, with the actual subject
matter and the source being seemingly secondary in importance.
V. Waiver
The personal nature of the privilege is intimately entwined with the ques-
tion of waiver. Generally speaking, the same cases which have held the privilege
to be personal to the reporter have stated that he is free to waive it and divulge
the confidential source's identity and the imparted information at his own will.'
Consequently, the informant cannot object when the journalist voluntarily testi-
fies. Put simply, the various shield statutes are permissive rather than mandatory
in granting the privilege. The problem of determining what constitutes waiver
arises, since most statutes are silent on this point and leave the matter to the
courts to determine.2" How much must a reporter reveal before it can be con-
cluded that he has at least implicitly waived his privilege? In one case the
California Supreme Court held that writing a story concerning information about
a speech by a union leader which contained parts in quotation marks but which
did not disclose the source from which the story was obtained did not constitute
waiver.24 On the other hand, a New Jersey case held that a newspaper which
had set forth the defenses of fair comment and reasonable belief as to the truth
of an editorial which formed the basis of a libel suit had waived its statutory
privilege and was therefore required to answer the plaintiff's interrogatories
concerning the source of the facts.2" This strict view of waiver contrasts radically
with the broader Pennsylvania view, which is that a waiver applies only to
statements made by an informer which are actually published or publicly dis-
closed and not to other statements made by the informer to the newspaper em-
ployee.28 Pennsylvania, in other words, permits selective waiver, allowing the
reporter to pick and choose that which he wants to divulge without waiving the
privilege for the undisclosed matters. This is an extreme rarity among the shield
jurisdictions, which, on the whole, interpret a waiver to have occurred whenever
the journalist reveals all or part of the privileged matter."
State legislatures should carefully consider waiver in drafting their shield
statutes-a precaution which few appear to have taken. Absent specific lan-
guage, courts are generally free to read in various traditional concepts of waiver
which the legislative body may or may not have intended.
Since the public supposedly is the primary beneficiary of the shield statutes,
the question arises as to whether a reporter should be prohibited from waiving
and testifying. The issue is a complex one and deserves closer legislative scrutiny
than it has previously been given.
22 Id.
23 Note, suprz note 3, at 108.
24 Ex parte Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955).
25 Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing and Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416
(1964).
26 In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1965).
27 D'Alemberte, journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of Informa-
tion, 6 HARVARD J. LEGIS. 307, 333-34 '(1969).
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VI. What Matter Is Protected?
A current problem in both drafting and interpreting the typical shield
statute involves its substantive scope: Should it protect only the identity of the
source or informant or, on a much broader scale, should it also cover the in-
formation which the source reveals to the reporter? The statutes are almost
-unanimous in limiting coverage to the "source" of the information,& however
that term may be construed. Only New York and Michigan 0 have chosen
to avoid this restriction with different language.
Even some of the states whose legislatures have singled out "sources" as
the only protected matter have had difficulty in deciding just what "sources"
means. Pennsylvania serves as a good example of this interpretive conflict.
The words of the statute are clear enough: The reporter cannot ". . . be re-
quired to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by
him ... ,,"" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied these words rather differ-
ently in the landmark decision of In re Taylor,2 giving the section an interpre-
tation broad enough to cover not only the identity of the informant but also any
documents involved. The case concerned an attempt to subpoena the tapes
and other records of a conversation held between a reporter for the Philadelphia
Evening Bulletin and a confidential informant concerning alleged corruption
in city government. The court decided that the statute must be construed liber-
ally in favor of the news media, and that documentary sources of information
used in writing the article were just as essential to the protection of the reporter
as the personal identity of the informant.3
Very few states have followed the path of Pennsylvania. For example,
almost identical language in Maryland's statute 4 was held by their courts in
Lightman v. State35 to protect only the personal identity of the source, and not
the accompanying information, unless such information would itself reveal the
source's identity. Kentucky gave such statutory language only a slightly broader
meaning when, in the state-level version of Branzburg,0 it was held that "source"
refers to the method by which or the person from whom the newsman gains his
information. A similarly strict construction in New Jersey in State v. Donovan"7
prompted that state's legislature to amend the statute to include ". . . source,
author, means, agency or person ... ,"! though the actual information is still
generally excluded from protection under such wording.
New York enacted its newsman's privilege statute in 1970 and used the
broadest language of all the shield jurisdictions. The statute protects the news-
28 E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45:1453 (Cum. Supp.
1972).
29 N.Y. CIV. RIG TS LAW § 79-h (MeKinney Supp. 1972).
30 McH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1972).
31 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
32 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
33 Id. at 40, 193 A.2d at 184-85.
34 M. ANN. CoDE art. 35, § 2 (1971).
35 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, 156; cert. denied, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972).
36 Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970), interpreting Ky. Rzv. STAT. §
421.100 (1969).
37 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 '(1943).
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, ch. 84A, § 21 (Supp. 1972).
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man from being cited for contempt for "... failing to disclose any news or the
source of any such news coming into his possession in the course of gathering
or obtaining news for publication or to be published. . . ."" In addition, the
statute defines "news? as ".... written, oral or pictorial information or commu-
nication concerning local, national or worldwide events or other matters of
public concern or public interest or affecting the public welfare."4 A more
all-inclusive privilege can hardly be conceived. However, New York courts to
date have chosen to limit coverage by reading in an otherwise unmentioned.
requirement of confidentiality, which is discussed below. For the moment it is
sufficient to say that if a newsman in New York obtains information confiden-
tially, both the content of the revelations and the identity of the revealer are
held sacrosanct.
To avoid the source/information interpretive controversy state legislative
drafters would do well to add qualifying provisions to their proposals. If only
personal identity is intended to be covered, such should be explicitly stated in
the text of the statute. New Jersey's qualifying phrase, even though contextually
it may be recognized as including only the personal or mechanical identity of
the source, does not seem to adequately solve the problem."1 It is helpful to
remember that the general purpose behind such statutes is to protect confidential
relationships in journalism. Normally this can be achieved by protecting the
source's identity, and not necessarily the content of the exchange. As long as
there is a competing public interest in revealing the content, such will be the
case in most states, New York to the contrary notwithstanding.
VII. The Question of Confidentiality
A concomitant problem in New York involves the requirement of con-
fidentiality or lack thereof. Since other shield statutes have coverage limited
to "sources," they never really reach the issue of confidentiality, either because
confidentiality is an express or implied prerequisite or because the "source"
limitation is so narrow as to make the question of acquired nonconfidential
information immaterial.42 New York's broad provisions, however, have caused
serious construction problems. Currently, the question is still being litigated
on the appellate level, but lower New York courts in two cases have, in effect,
read in a requirement of confidentiality. In In re WBAI-FM, s the court held
that where information received is not the result of affirmative questioning of a
person by a news media agent acting as such, it cannot be protected. In WBAI
a radio announcer had received an anonymous tip-off call regarding a bombing,
directing employees to a place where a written statement was to be found. The
court stated that there was no confidential relationship involved here and, there-
fore, the statement could be subpoenaed. Making a policy judgment, the court
held that the statute "... cannot be distorted through breadth of interpretation
39 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1972).
40 Id.
41 Note, supra note 3, at 107.
42 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1972).
43 68 Misc. 2d 355, 326 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1971).
[October 1973]
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to the point of impairing the orderly process of the investigation of crime....
Another New York lower court found similarly and even more specifically
in People u. Wolf.4 5 In this case the Villzge Voice published an article on the
Tombs riot under the by-line of an inmate indicted for taking part in the up-
rising. The court held that the inmate could not gain immunity from subpoena
through the statute simply because he wrote the article. Under the New York
statute information or its sources must be imparted to a reporter under a "cloak
of confidentiality" upon an understanding, express or implied, that information
or its sources will not be disclosed. 6 In a rather conclusory fashion, the court
in Wolf found the element of confidentiality "implicit" in the statute.
With appeals now pending, the New York law in this regard is still in
doubt. Perhaps if one considers the consequences of an overly broad-but,
admittedly, liberal-interpretation of the statute, the outcome of the issue at
the New York Court of Appeals level can be predicted. Taking the statute
literally, a newsman could conceivably be an eyewitness to a crime, while inter-
viewing an informant or not, and still be protected from testifying regarding
what he saw, provided, of course, he were acting in a "newsgathering capacity."
Accepting an equally broad construction of "newsgathering capacity," it is not
hard to see that the newsman is being granted a professional immunity virtually
without parameters. It is indeed doubtful whether the New York Legislature in-
tended such an all-encompassing result when it enacted § 79-h of the Civil
Rights Law.
VIII. Is the Privilege Absolute or Qualified?
All but three of the state newsman's shield statutes grant an absolute privi-
lege; that is, once certain definitional criteria are met, the reporter cannot be
deprived of his privilege because of any overriding public interest, no matter
how valuable the desired information or identity may be." Alaska, Arkansas,
and Louisiana, however, have adopted a different approach which in general
grants the newsman a testimonial privilege to the extent that the interests of
public justice will allow. Under the Arkansas statute, before a reporter can be
denied the privilege, ".... it must be shown that [his] article was written, pub-
lished or broadcast in bad faith, with malice, and not in the interests of the
public welfare."4 This qualification, which focuses largely on motive and con-
tent, both compares and contrasts with that of Louisiana, which, after setting
out a rather detailed procedure for revocation, states that the ". . . order shall
be granted only when the court, after hearing the parties, shall find that the
disclosure is essential to the public interest."49 Alaska's statute is the broadest
of the three in this regard, stating that a court may deny the privilege ".... if it
finds the withholding of the testimony would (1) result in a miscarriage of jus-
44 Id.
45 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1972).
46 Id.
47 E.g., Ala. Code tit. 7, § 370 '(1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, ch. 84A, § 21 (Supp.
1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
48 Aax. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964).
49 LA. lRv. STAT. ANN. § 45:1453 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
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tice or the denial of a fair trial to those who challenge the privilege; or (2)
be contrary to the public interest." 50 Unfortunately, there are no available cases
in the three states which have adjudicated individual situations which might fit
under these qualifications.
The concept of a qualified shield statute seems valuable in resolving the
previously mentioned conflict of values: the protection of the free press versus
the full disclosure of evidence in the courts. Mr. Justice Powell suggested such
a compromise position in his concurring opinion in Branzburg:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obliga-
tion of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.
The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-
case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such
questions.51
In more specific terms, Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent lists those occasions when,
for reasons of public interest, the newsman should be denied the evidentiary
privilege:
[W]hen a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal con-
fidences, I would hold the government must (1) show that there is probable
cause to believe that the newsman has information which is clearly relevant
to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the informa-
tion sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding
interest in the information.52
Obviously, Justice Stewart's suggested standards are considerably more
precise and strict than Justice Powell's and those employed by Louisiana, Arkan-
sas, and Alaska, but they are all alike in that they add subjectively determinable
conditions to the exercise of the privilege. Such qualifications, unless worded in
most precise terms, can effectively negate any benefit to be derived from a shield
statute. Since a broad qualification, such as Louisiana's, puts the real onus on
the court, the privilege becomes a discretionary one subject to the individual
judge's decision. Inevitably, this discretion is open to abuse, and the newsman
may end up with no more than what the common law gave him-no privilege
at all. As Justice Powell states, the privilege is reduced to one determined on a
case-by-case basis which means an increased court caseload and an added source
of pretrial controversy. Above all, one should consider the effect this would
have on the asserted reason for enacting the newsman's privilege statute in the
first place. If the purpose is to encourage confidences, then a qualified privilege
may very well prove counterproductive. Knowing the journalist's privilege to
be a conditional one, an informant may understandably hesitate or refuse to give
information to the newsman when he is unsure of the security of their relation-
50 ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.160 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
51 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (concurring opinion).
52 Id. at 743 (dissenting opinion).
[October 1973]
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ship." These considerations lead to the conclusion than an absolute privilege,
bound within certain definitional parameters (e.g., "source" only), is more
desirable than a fluid, uncertain, qualified version.
IX. Other Statutory Requirements
In six states54 the journalist cannot claim his privilege of withholding the
source's identity unless he has published or broadcast the information secured.
The rationale behind this appears to be that if the public is to be served by the
journalist's confidences, then eventually the information must reach the people,
either in print or through court testimony. However, nine other states55 offer
the privilege without any such publication requirement. Interestingly, Arkansas
requires that the acquired information be ". . . written, published or broad-
cast . . . ,"56 a requirement which ostensibly could be fulfilled by having the
reporter take written notes.
It has been contended that to require publication as a necessary condition
precedent to the protection of the statute would fail to give enough protection
to the source, and without such protection the potential source would not feel
free to make disclosures.57 Both published and unpublished communications
may and do rely on a confidential relationship, and, lest the newsman be told
what to print under threat of losing his privilege, it seems sound to have no
publication requirement at all. This is especially true since the major goal of
facilitating confidences is achieved regardless of publication.
Ohio and Pennsylvania are alone among the states in requiring that if a
radio or television station or employee thereof wishes to claim an evidentiary
privilege, a record of any broadcast material must be kept available for a given
period of time.5 However, this is not a true broadcast requirement since the
statutes do not require broadcast as a condition precedent to claiming the privi-
lege. The words of the Ohio statute are:
Every commercial radio broadcasting station, and every commercial
television broadcasting station, shall maintain for a period of six months
from the date of its broadcast thereof, a record of those statements of in-
formation the source of which was procured or obtained by persons em-
ployed by the station in gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, disseminat-
ing, publishing or broadcasting news.
Record as used in this section shall include a tape, disc, script or any
53 Note, supra note 3, at 108.
54 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Cum. Supp. 1972);
CAL. Evw. CODE § 1070 (West 1966); Ky. REv. STAT. § 421.100 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 35, § 2 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, ch. 84A, § 21 (1971).
55 ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150-220 (Cum. Supp. 1972); IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1 '(1973);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45:1451-1454 (Cum. Supp. 1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1)
(1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. fit. 93, ch. 601-2 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1
(1970); N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1972); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2739.12 (1954), § 2739.04 (Cure. Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28 § 330 '(Cum. Supp.
1972).
56 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964).
57 D'Alemberte, supra note 27, at 336-37.




other item or document which sets forth the content of the statements which
are required by this section to be recorded.5 9
Such a requirement serves the public interest by guaranteeing future access
to already disclosed information, while at the same time protecting the con-
fidential relationship.
X. The Conflict of Laws Problem
Case I: Assume P sues D in Federal District Court in state X, which has
no newsman's privilege statute, and P attempts to secure the identity of a con-
fidential source through a deposition from reporter R in state Y, which does
have a shield statute. Can P force R to disclose his source? Held: No.
Case II: Assume P sues D in Federal District Court in state Y, which
recognizes a privilege for journalists, and P seeks a deposition of reporter R in
state X, which lacks a shield statute. Can P force R to disclose his source?
Held: No.
These two actual cases, classic examples of the conflict of laws problem
in this area, are seemingly contradictory but at this time are the sole precedents
available. Case I is Ex parte Sparrow,6" in which Dell Publishing Company
sued for libel in New York, which at that time had no shield law. Depositions
were taken of witness Sparrow, a reporter who refused to disclose the source of
the questioned article, in Alabama, a shield jurisdiction. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama stated:
While this court does not consider the question of privilege to be a
matter of substance and therefore controlled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 . . . , it would appear that this court should refer to the
statutory law of Alabama in the absence of any Federal rule on
privilege .... 61
• . . [R]ule 26, under which examination was being conducted, provides
that "... . the deponent may be examined regarding any matter not priv-
ileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the ending
action .... For the purpose of determining the witness' claim of privilege,
this court, by rule 37, is constituted the forum or the place where plaintiff,
the proponent, is required to pursue his remedy to compel the witness to
answer.
62
This both compares and contrasts with Case II, Cepeda V. Cohane,6 in
which Orlando Cepeda sued Look magazine for libel in a California state court.
The action was removed to a Federal District Court in California, and an at-
tempt was made to take a deposition from the author in New York. At the time
California had a shield law but New York did not. The court held that the
59 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Gum. Supp. 1972).
60 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
61 At this point the court cited in a footnote Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 106 F.2d
618 (8th Cir. 1939).
62 14 F.R.D. 351, 353 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
63 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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public policy of California, rather than that of New York, controlled, and that
when depositions are taken in a state other than the trial state, the law of the
trial state governs. Unlike Sparrow, the court here did definitively state that
privilege is a matter of substantive law. It recognized an exception when the
deposition state has its own shield law and the trial state does not, which is the
situation in Sparrow, so the two cases appear consistent at least on the surface."'
Needless to say, the extreme paucity of cases on this question makes the
rendering of a general rule impossible. At this writing there is no federal news-
man's privilege. This would force a federal court in a statutory conflict situation
either to adopt the confused Sparrow-Cepeda approach or strike out on its own
in a virtually uncharted area. Once again it is evident how relatively unlitigated
has been the overall question of state shield statutes.
XI. Conclusion
At this stage a number of points should have become more than evident.
First, newsman's privilege jurisdictions vary greatly in their approaches to the
problem. Whether it be the subject matter covered, the media included, the
question of "source," or other miscellaneous requirements, there is certainly no
unanimity; very few general majority rules can be gleaned from the statutes.
Second, a majority of the states have chosen not to grant newsmen any eviden-
tiary privilege at all. Whether this will change now that Branzburg has been
decided remains to be seen. Even if all the other jurisdictions adopt shield
statutes, the problem of nonuniformity remains. The great variance of protec-
tion and nonprotection from state to state has a detrimental effect on the effec-
tive operation of a free press. At the present time newsmen, unless they have
constant legal guidance, are understandably unsure of where they stand in the
morass-especially as they move from one state to another in their professional
status. Network and national publication reporters are constantly crossing state
lines, thus traversing jurisdictions offering varying degrees of protection. The
legal problems are obvious, and the resultant uncertainty can only hinder the
proper functioning of the press in gathering information, confidential and other-
wise.
The solution to this problem rests in either a uniform state law adopted
nationwide or federal legislation. Past experience demonstrates the severe im-
practicality of the former, particularly in a matter of such controversy. The con-
clusion, therefore, must be that uniformity can only be achieved through an
act of Congress which contains the best features of the state shield statutes and
is applicable on both the federal and state levels. Journalism is a feature of
interstate commerce; the commerce clause could be the basis for the statute's
constitutionality, just as it has been for so many other apparently local matters
in this century.65 Interstate consistency and a truly free press demand no less.
Stephen F. Peifer
64 Note, supra note 3, at 111.
65 E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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